Abstract
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF):
The average time expected to elapse between one failure occurring and the next failure. This time includes the time taken to rectify the fault. The time taken to rectify the problem could be relatively short, for instance the fault could be rectified by restarting the software or the failure could be handled by a fault tolerance system, or it could be relatively long, for instance a fault may have to be fixed in the system before execution can continue.
Fault Injection: since the MTBF for a given failure may be very long since the statements containing the error may be executed infrequently, fault injection attempts to speed up this process by injecting faults into a running system in an attempt to cause the execution of seldom used control pathways within a system. By doing this either a failure will occur or the systems fault tolerance mechanism will handle the fault.
Network Level Fault Injection: injects faults by corrupting, dropping or reordering network packets at the network interface. It is possible to inject faults by instrumenting the protocol stack as in [9] but this runs the risk of being detected and rejected by the receiving systems protocol stack. I t is therefore preferable to inject the fault at the application level before this stage [2] . They are then processed normally by the protocol stacks at both ends and can be relayed to the application layer.
The faults injected are based on the corruption of packet header information and injecting random byte errors into packet payloads.
Fault Ontology Environment
The term ontology originates in meta-physics and is broadly defined as "A philosophy concerned with the nature of being" [10] . Ontologies are widely described as controlled vocabularies, thesauri, hierarchies of terms, and conceptualization of domains. There is a great diversity in the design of ontologies and how they represent the real world [11] and they can vary in scale from flat lexicons with few relationships, to very large, expressive ontologies attempting to capture every possible aspect of a domain.
From a computing perspective, ontologies can be considered in the following way: "A formal and explicit specification of a shared conceptualization" [12] . A conceptualization is a simplified view, or part of the real world, described in terms of its components and their inter relationships. More generally, an ontology can be described as an abstract, formal and explicit study of existence: abstract, expressing a particular view; formal, being in accord with accepted conventions, and specific enough for software; explicit, clearly expressed and leaving nothing implied.
Ontologies are used in scientific research to classify and analyse data, including combination of data sets into virtual experiments. In addition, they are used extensively in the medicine through shared descriptions of medical terms [13] .
Ontologies have also been applied to the description of hardware faults and failures. Kitamura and Mizoguchi showed that although a malfunctioning component may have been identified as the cause of a symptom, deeper causes of the fault could remain misunderstood or unknown, and an ontology could be used to explain these events through classification of the fault domain [14] .
Ontologies with the capability to model real-world applications may be complex and require modularization [15] , for instance they could benefit from being broken into smaller components or sub-ontologies. However, where this occurs, relations between sub-ontologies would also have to be defined so that the concepts described in each sub-ontology are understood.
We consider that the use of ontologies will be a useful mechanism to improve dependability via more accurate fault and failure modeling and improved evaluation. We aim to define methods for explicit specification of objects, axioms, relationships and constraints within the software fault and failure domains.
Test Case Generation
There are many problems associated with using traditional testing techniques and formal proofs on distributed systems. Dependability assessment provides a technique for allowing a level of confidence in a system to be obtained, even though this does not assure correct operation under all circumstances.
Our method and tools provide dependability assessment that can be applied too SOA to allow an indication of the level of dependability of a system. There are many variations possible for an SOA.
For the purpose of our method we will define an SOA as being a system, composed of a number of services and clients interconnected via a middleware layer. Clients can make use of services via the middleware layer and services may make use of other services via a middleware layer and hence be a client of another service. We further assume a homogenous middleware layer is used by each service, although the services may run on heterogeneous platforms.
We addresse three areas of dependability assessment: 1) injection mechanism; 2) automatic test generation; 3) automatic failure detection. Further we intend our method to be extendable and act as a framework, so the ontology models we are developing are generic and can be adapted to specific systems.
Framework
The framework uses a modified Network Level Fault Injection technique to inject faults into the system. It intercepts messages flowing between SOA elements, injects faults into them, and then transmits them onto their destination. Rather than inject faults based on random corruption techniques such as bit flipping, etc. as in standard Network Level Fault Injection, our method decodes each message and injects meaningful faults, such as modifying RPC parameters and results, so that they are syntactically correct but may be out of specified ranges. The method builds on this framework to allow test cases to be written. These test cases can either be written manually or automatically generated using our fault model ontology.
An ontology is created from the WSDL definitions for each element in the SOA. This ontology can then be used to supply information that can be used to create triggers for test cases. We further create two more ontologies, one to provide a basis for automatic test case generation and a second t o facilitate automatic failure detection.
Fault Model Ontology
Our fault model ontology takes the standard concept of a fault model and extends it to include more detail. This is done by apply the technique of functional decomposition to the top level fault model, for instance we can define a normal fault model (see Figure 1 ) which shows a fairly standard fault model for an SOA. Then each item in the fault model is decomposed into a more detailed subcategory after which further decompose of each item in the model can continue until a level is reached where we have a detailed enough description to implement a specific test case (see Figure 2 ).
• Physical Faults
Figure 1: High Level Fault Model
The detailed test case should be generic enough so that it can be applied to any message/parameter of an appropriate type, for instance a test case could be written to perturb any integer input parameter so that it contains a random value within a specified range. The range is entered for a particular parameter and obtained from the specification of that RPC.
The fault model ontology is intended to be extendable so that a user of the system can customize the fault model ontology to cater for their system. The ontology described here and implemented in the tools is therefore not extensive but is intended to provide a basic level of functionality that can be enhanced for a specific system. It is possible, by careful perturbation of input parameters, to perturb the internal state of a service but this requires detailed knowledge of the design of the service and so is considered outside the scope of this method's automatic test case generation, but it can be accomplished via manual test case construction and manual inspection of the service code.
• Software Faults o Perturbation of Data into a Service  Values in Specified Range • Upper Bound • Replace specified parameter with the upper bound value specified for this parameter.
• Lower Bound
• Replace specified parameter with the lower bound value specified for this parameter.
• Lower Bound + 1
• Replace specified parameter with the lower bound value specified for this parameter with one added to it.
• Upper Bound -1
• Replace the specified parameter with the upper bound specified for this parameter with one subtracted from it.
• Random Values between Upper and Lower Bounds
• On test generation, generate a static sequence of randomly distributed values that lie between the upper and lower bounds inclusively. Cyclically substitute the next value from the statically generated sequence for the specified parameter. To detect potential failures in a system, our method includes a failure modes ontology. This is similar in concept to the fault model ontology described in Section 4.2. We have defined a high level set of failure modes that are suitable for use with an SOA (see Figure 3 ).
• Crash of a service instance Our method applies decomposition to the failure modes in a similar way to the fault model ontology, to give a failure mode ontology. Decomposition is applied iteratively to the failure modes to compose a number of partial ontologies. These partial ontologies sub-divide each failure mode into a number of sub-ontologies until a simple enough level is reached, at which point a script can be written to detect the detailed failure mode (see Figure 4 ).
• Corruption of data out of service o Data out of range  Data above upper bound • Check specified parameter against upper bound in specification and if it is greater than this value flag an error condition.  Data below upper bound
• Check specified parameter against lower bound in specification and if it is less that this value flag an error condition.
Figure 4: Detailed Failure Model
Once a detailed failure mode ontologies is available, it is applied to the whole (or part) of the SOA, so unlike the fault model ontology it is active for all message exchanges so it can detect normal failures as well as failures caused by fault injection.
To aid in failure detection our method allows three predefined outcomes from a fault injection operation: 1) exception; 2) response out of specified range; 3) no visible effect. These outcomes are specified after a test case has triggered and apply to the next message exchange in sequence.
The exception outcome is the normal outcome to be expected from a fault injection since wellwritten code should detect parameter perturbation and reject the transaction. If we expect this outcome and do not detect the expected outcome this would be flagged to the user as a discrepancy.
The response out of specified range outcome is typically to be expected from a system in the development or testing phase of a project when not all guard mechanisms are present. This would typically result from a perturbed input parameter creating a perturbed result and should therefore be flagged to the user. We may expect this outcome if the result is being intentionally perturbed to allow it to be feed into another to perturb that component.
The no visible effect outcome would typically be expected mainly from the message manipulation fault model class. This outcome would arise if normal message flows continued with no corruption of output data or exceptions. This is most likely to occur under two sub-classes: 1) omission of messages from client to server, since the server would have no mechanism for knowing the original message had been sent so it could not generate an exception; 2) message manipulation involving time, since if a timeout is not reached this would result in a performance degradation rather than timeout exceptions. In both cases a specialized test script in the failure model would need to be constructed t o test for these on a per system basis. This outcome could also be seen when parameters are perturbed within their specified range. In this case a manually constructed script would be written to detect the expected outcome on a per test basis.
WS-FIT
The WS-FIT (Web Service -Fault Injection Technology) tool and method has been developed specifically to perform Network Level Fault Injection and parameter perturbation on SOAP based SOA. It has been implemented specifically to test SOA and a detailed description of its design is given in [5] . The main use of this technology is envisaged as state perturbation through the targeted modification of RPC parameters within SOAP messages and injecting communications faults. This is particularly useful in assessing fault tolerance mechanisms.
Our method considers a variation of Network Level Fault Injection as a means of determining system dependability. Although we intend to inject faults into network packets we cannot do this directly because of the problems of altering encrypted/signed packets after they have been constructed. We therefore inject the faults at the API boundary between the application and the top of the protocol stack, this being the lowest, easily accessible point to inject faults before any encryption and signing has taken place. It overcomes these problems and allows us the level of control that we require for parameter perturbation. Specification data can be added manually through the tool, for instance upper and lower bounds on parameters, but eventually our aim is to remove this manual step and import the information directly from electronically stored specifications.
The ontology can be used to decode and intercepted RPCs and allow the user to construct triggers to fire on certain events. Test scripts can be constructed to run on the triggers and inject perturbations into RPC messages in much the same way that state perturbation functions operate using code insertion techniques.
It also provides facilities to capture RPC data and aid in the construction of test cases. There is a real time visualization facility, which allows RPC messages and parameters to be visualized in realtime. Also there is a profiling facility to help in determining which elements of the SOA and which methods to concentrate analysis on.
Test Cases
To provide a test bed to demonstrate WS-FIT we have constructed a test system that simulates a typical stock market trading system. This system is composed of a number of Web Services: 1) A service to supply real-time stock quotes; 2) A service to automatically trade shares; 3) A bank service that provides a simple interface to allow deposits, withdrawals and balance requests; 4) A client t o interact with the SOA.
We have implemented our stock quoting service to use a large repeated dataset, stored in a backend database to produce a time based real-time stock quote. Since the quote service is based around a database containing the simulated quote values it is possible to replicate a test run exactly by resetting time etc. to a set of starting conditions. Our trading service implements a simple automatic buying and selling mechanism. An upper and lower limit is set which triggers trading in shares. Shares are sold when the high limit is exceeded and shares are brought when the quoted price is less than the lower limit.
The buying and selling process involves transferring money using the bank service and multiple quotes (one to trigger the transaction and one to calculate the cost of the transaction). Since these multiple transactions involve processing time and network transfer time this constitutes a race condition since our quoting service produces timed real-time quotes. Any such race condition leaves the potential for the system to lose money since the initial quote price may be different from the final purchase price.
This paper details three different series of data: 1) A baseline set of data with the system running normally; 2) A simulated faulty/malicious service 3) A simulated heavily loaded server.
Our test system was implemented using Apache Tomcat 5.0.28 with Web Services implemented using Apache Axis 1.1, hosted on Fedora Linux Core 2 running on 2Ghz IA-32 Processors.
Baseline Test
Our base line test is designed to demonstrate the system running under normal conditions. This provides a series of data to compare further test cases against. We instrument the system for all tests.
This instrumentation allows us to not only inject faults into the system, but also monitor the RPC exchanges between Web Services (see Figure 6 ). We have demonstrated in previous research that the latency introduced by this instrumentation is negligible when compared to Internet message transfer times involved in a SOAP based SOA [4] . 
Figure 7: Baseline Test Series
The first series of data collected from the normally running system allows us to verify that the system operates according to its specification. Figure 7 shows a summary of the results collected and demonstrates that the deviation between the original quoted prices and the transaction completion price is negligible 0.5%. The test case was iterated five times and the transactions from each were compared. Apart from minor timing variations the analysis showed that the test case was repeatable as can be seen in Figure 8 . 
Comparision of Test Runs
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Figure 8: Baseline Test Series

Faulty/Malicious Service
The second test series simulated a faulty/malicious quote service by applying one of our predefined fault model ontology tests to the quote service. The test chosen was a test that generated a random value that is within the specified range for the parameter it is applied to. The random model used injects a normally distributed randomly generated value that replaces the RPC parameter specified.
We used the same starting conditions as the first test series and iterated the test series five times. Figure 9 : Attack Injection Figure 9 shows the results of the analysis. The data shows a clear deviation from the first test series since the quote service is returning different data. Each test run was repeatable since the randomly generated sequence is contained statically within the test script. During all test runs the system appeared to run correctly from a user perspective but by comparing it to the first test series it was shown that the system was being corrupted by the fault, with the consequence that the share trades were inaccurate (see Figure 8 and Figure 10 ).
The failure mode ontology is capable of detecting this since our specification specified a time duration for quote repeatability. Within this period the quote service must return the same result.
Since each value from the quote service is replaced by a random value and the repeated value for a quote and transaction falls within this time duration, it was possible to customize our failure mode ontology with a script to detect this from the data extracted from the WSDL and original specification. 
Comparision of Test Runs
Figure 10: Attack Data Series
The test series showed that it was possible for the system to be corrupted/attacked without the user being aware of any such failure.
Latency Injection
The third and final series of data in this set of tests again injected a fault into the system. This fault was an increased latency induced into the quote service. This latency simulates server latency.
To implement this we again used one of the predefined tests in the fault model ontology. The test used introduced a delay into the system based on a possion distribution. The distribution is statically encoded into the test script to allow for repeatability. A latency was first introduced into the quote service and a series of data was collected, then a second series of data was collected with the latency introduced into the bank service. The test was iterated over five runs. Figure 11: Latency Injection Figure 11 contains the results from the injection performed on the quote service. This clearly shows that the system is functioning differently to the baseline test series. By analysis the test data gathered we can see that the quote value that triggers a sale or purchase of shares differs from sale/purchase price 64% of the time. This is due to some quote values being delayed long enough t o cause the quote to fall into the next quote period (see Figure 12 ).
We repeated this test by injecting the same latency into the bank service parameter rather than the quote service. This produced results comparable to those obtained above. Since the race condition designed into the system includes both a call to the quote service and the bank service this similarity is to be expected.
This test series demonstrates not only that the system is susceptible to delays introduced by loaded servers but also that a user of WS-FIT need not have detailed knowledge of the system to use the fault model otology since it is not critical where latency is introduced into this system. Again our WS-FIT failure model can detect this failure using the same failure model test as the second test series. 
Comparision of Test Runs
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have demonstrated that WS-FIT can be used to analyze a SOA. We have easily injected faults into the SOA that simulate seldom encountered situations, namely a faulty/malicious service and a heavily loaded server. We have done this in a non-invasive manner requiring a minimum of instrumentation code on the servers running the SOA.
We have also demonstrated that our Extended Fault Model ontology can be used to automatically generate fault injection test cases. This required a minimum of user intervention apart from constructing the ontology for the SOA by importing WSDL and selecting the services/methods t o inject faults into. For our test scenario we further demonstrated that applying the same latency injection to a number of points in the system could generate a similar effect, therefore demonstrating that for our test scenario user knowledge of the injection point was not important to the test outcome.
Our failure mode ontology has been applied to our test results to demonstrate it's potential for detecting failures in a SOA. The current failure mode ontology is a proof of concept and further work is required to enhance this and integrate it into our WS-FIT tool.
Our future work will concentrate on the following areas:
Firstly we indent to expand both our fault model ontology and our failure mode ontology t o provide better test coverage of and SOA under test. The fault model ontology will be required to build an effective fault and failure ontology. It is anticipated that this will be capable of producing metricbased evaluations of fault injection on SOA. We aim to improve dependability in services by providing criteria and metrics capable of evaluating dependability. This should produce comparison metrics capable of facilitating value judgments in the dependability of competing services. In further experiments we shall enhance and incorporate our fault model ontology to facilitate automatic failure detection.
Secondly we intend to apply our WS-FIT method to more complex systems to allow us to not only improve and develop our method and tool but to collect metrics for use by our failure mode ontology. This will allow us to refine our ontology and assess it's reliability in detecting failure states in SOA.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the EPSRC/DTI e-Demand project, the DAME project and by the EPSRC through a DTA studentship.
